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| **TC** | **Video** | **Audio** |
| 02:34:03:20 |  | NARR: If surviving a Soviet H-bomb is impossible, the only option is to deter them from attacking in the first place.  |
|  | *SAC planes, pilots, etc* |  |
|  | *Audio Archival re: SAC* | NARR: To do that, president Eisenhower creates a new policy. Any Soviet aggression will be met with massive nuclear retaliation, delivered by the Strategic Air Command – SAC.  |
| 02:34:33:09 |  | NARR: SAC is led by Curtis LeMay. LeMay realizes that the bomb has forever changed war.  |
|  |  | Richard Rhodes: He saw very early that wars would last for days or even hours. And everything had to happen right up front. |
|  |  | NARR: To win in days or hours, LeMay plans a massive first strike on the Soviet Union – what he calls a “Sunday Punch.” Ready to go at a moment’s notice, his crews drill constantly.  |
|  | Archival: SAC *Planes, pilots, alerts*  |  |
| 02:35:16:19 |  | Walter Boyne: All of a sudden, you’ve got 90 airplanes that are departing this airport nuclear weapons on board. You take off, you don’t know whether it’s really a mission or not. Everything is so classified; you won’t get those coded instructions until you are airborne. And you know that at 8 or 10 other bases, the same damn thing is happening, that this flow of airplanes are in the air, they will be coming towards the Soviet Union, and unless the Soviet Union backs down shortly, it’s not gonna be around. |
|  | Archival: “When this red phone is picked up, direct lines to SAC bases on four continents are seized.” |  |
| 02:35:49:21 |  | NARR: Massive retaliation means US defense is increasingly dominated by the Air Force.  |
|  |  | Richard Rhodes: the air force controlled forty seven percent of the national defense budget. At which point the navy and the army began thinking wow, we better get some atomic bombs too. |
| 02:36:08:12 |  | NARR: As the military services compete, America’s nuclear stockpile grows and diversifies.  |
|  |  | Glen McDuff: Los Alamos was happy to make it, and the military was happy to pay for it. And so, every time they asked for something, the lab responded, sure no problem. |
|  |  | John Hopkins: Nuclear weapons were viewed as just regular weapons only bigger. |
|  |  | Robert Norris: How many different kinds can we fabricate? |
| 02:36:32:20 |  | Chuck Loeber: Big bombs, little bombs, big warheads, little warheads. |
|  | Marines in desert…atomic cannon fires… mushroom cloud  | NARR: A nuclear cannon for ground troops.  |
|  | *Backpack Nuke: training film* | NARR: Even a one-man backpack nuke – a way to stop thousands of Soviet tanks from invading Germany.  |
|  | *Archival Audio* | John Andersen: blocking avenues of approach by barriers of flooding, and cratering and land sliding, attacking autobahns or highways or railroads, or bridges. Atomic demolition munitions. |
| 02:37:16:23 |  | NARR: Eventually the drive to make a nuclear version of anything and everything gets a little out of hand.  |
|  |  | John Hopkins: There was a nuclear bazooka which I think probably is a contender for being the most ridiculous. |
|  | *“M388 Davy Crockett Operational Test” film:**“It detonated perfectly, releasing its lethal radiation!”* |  |
|  |  | Chuck Loeber: Some of the physicists said we could actually develop a nuclear hand grenade. The only problem was finding somebody dumb enough to throw it. |
|  |  | Robert Norris: So the stockpile, the American stockpile blossoms. |
| 02:37:49:04 |  | Chuck Loeber: By 1947 we had a stockpile of 13, by 1953 we had over 1,100, by the late 60s we had over 31,000 nuclear weapons and 36 different types. |
|  |  | Glen McDuff: I kinda wonder exactly did you really need all this? But I think a lot of it was the military thought they did. And a lot is I think is just political. You know, we have more than you |